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When Ferae Naturae Attack: Public Policy Implications and
Concerns for the Public and State regarding the Classification
of Indigenous Wildlife as Interpreted Under State Immunity
Statutes
L. Reagan Florence1
“All meanings, we know, depend on the key of
interpretation”
—George Eliot 2
I. INTRODUCTION
On a family campout an 11-year-old boy is stolen, still in his
sleeping bag—dragged in the middle of the night from his tent by a
wild black bear—the boy is mauled to death.3 This gruesome and
tragic incident sparked a recent perplexing court decision that has
unhinged the very notion of municipal and governmental liability
under respective immunity statute.4 The decision proved that there
are contrasting opinions and public policy concerns on whether a
state government can be held liable for a black bear dismembering a
small boy, and on whether a black bear should fall under a State’s

1

The author would like to sincerely thank the Hamline Journal of Public Law
and Policy and its members for their support and assistance in the production of
this article; the author further thanks her family for their love and support—
especially Gerald B. Robinson Jr. for his life-long influence, and his contagious
passion for life, knowledge, law, and nature; and most importantly, this article
respectfully remembers the life of Samuel Ives—whose tragic story and case
gave rise to the idea for this article.
2
GEORGE ELLIOT, DANIEL DERONDA (1876).
3
Israelsen, see infra text accompanying note 9.
4
See generally Francis v. State, Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., No. 20111027, 2013
UT 65 (Utah 2013).
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waiver of immunity exceptions as a “natural condition” on the
land.5
State Immunity Acts generally preclude suits against the
State in certain narrow situations by providing exceptions for States
in regard to municipal tort liability.6 Under these statutes the state
can assert immunity with respect to the recreational use of property,
or with respect to conditions on particular unimproved properties.7
For example, under many municipal immunity statutes there is an
exception of a “natural condition” on the land, which holds the
State immune to suit if an individual is injured as a result of such
condition.8 This article examines the state of Utah’s Immunity Act
(and exceptions), and the policy implications facing the public and
State stemming from the statutory interpretation by the Utah
Supreme Court in the recent case, Francis v. State (Francis).
The purpose of this article is to show that the Utah Supreme
Court came to the wrong decision in Francis, by excluding a black
bear from the “natural condition” exception under Utah’s Immunity
Act, and thereby opening the State to liability. Further this article
will show that indigenous wildlife is a condition of the natural land.
And for strong public policy reasons, Immunity Acts should be
broadly interpreted to include indigenous wildlife within the
5

Id.
Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts,
Constitutional Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 804-05 (2007)
(Only the State of Washington has enacted particular legislation that holds
governmental defendants liable under tort law similarly to private situations and
private tortfeasors, while all other states have statutory measures of limiting such
liability under tort law).
7
63 C.J.S. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 1051 (West).
8
Rosenthal, supra note 6, at 808, (stating that jurisdictions typically treat these
specific particular immunity sections under either the condition of
property/facilities used for recreational purposes, or that of unimproved public
property); see also Rosenthal at 805-809 (discussing other types of general state
immunity statutes that include: immunity for injuries caused by reliance on
statutes or other enactments; specified intentional torts of public employees;
immunity from particular punitive damages; immunity for the failure to provide
adequate police service or protection; a failure to provide adequate firefighting or
other emergency services, and medical care, etc).
6

158

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 35:1

“natural condition” exception, and alternatively should be drafted to
expressly include indigenous wildlife within these exceptions.
First, Section II of this article introduces the tragic 2007
incident of young boy, Samuel Ives, who was tragically mauled,
and killed by a black bear in a Utah campground. Litigation from
the tragic incident against both the United States and the State of
Utah is then introduced, and a history for the Utah case is presented
in Section III. Section IV demonstrates the main issue of the article
and specifically examines the recent controversial decision by the
Utah Supreme Court in the case against the State of Utah, Francis
v. State (Francis)—where the court excluded a black bear as a
“natural condition” on the land, under Utah’s Immunity Act, which
opened State to liability.
Section V of the article examines the befuddling reasoning
of the Utah Supreme Court’s (majority) holding in Francis, that
wildlife is excluded as a “natural condition” under both Utah case
law and the Immunity Act. Then, Section VI contrastingly displays
the paradoxical nature of the majority’s holding under both Utah
case law and statutory interpretation, and displays the more
appropriate reasoning behind the opinion of the Francis dissent.
This section further displays that under proper interpretation of both
the Immunity Act and Utah case law, indigenous wildlife is a
“natural condition”.
Next Section VII displays other jurisdictions and cases
where courts have held that indigenous wildlife is a “natural
condition”, or condition on the land under Immunity Acts.
Following, Section VIII examines specific language of selected
Immunity Acts under particular analysis of case law interpretations
where wildlife was considered a “natural condition”. This section
then offers express suggestions to Utah lawmakers to change the
current Immunity Act, as to include wildlife under the “natural
condition” exception.
Section IX contemplates the policy considerations under the
opinion of the Francis majority, and contrastingly presents the
negative tax, public, economic, and environmental ramifications of
the majority’s decision. Lastly, Section X concludes that the
majority’s decision in Francis was unfounded and incorrect, and
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that a more proper decision would have reflected that of the opinion
of the dissent, under proper interpretation of Utah case law and the
Immunity Act. This section also reiterates the potential negative
public policy concerns and considerations by excluding indigenous
wildlife as a “natural condition” under Immunity Act exceptions,
and the decision in Francis. Further this section restates that
Immunity Statutes should be construed broadly to include wildlife,
but that to avoid decisions like Francis lawmakers should change
current Immunity Acts to include wildlife as a “natural condition”.
II. DISCUSSION OF UTAH INCIDENT
For the state of Utah, June 2007 avowed a tragic news
headline, “Boy killed by bear—the 11 year old was pulled from his
tent”.9 Even more unsettling were the details that began to emerge
hour by hour with the updated reports. The boy, Samuel Ives, was
sleeping in a tent with his family (the Mulveys) at the State-run
Timpooneke Campground when in the middle of the night a black
bear dragged Ives from the tent in his sleeping bag and killed him.10
Reports surfaced that during the incident Ives’ family could hear his
screams of terror, but could not locate him outside of the tent; the
family filed an abduction report after their unsuccessful searching.11
Several hours later however, officers successfully found Ives’
young and lifeless body approximately 400 yards from the family’s
tent.12 The following day the bear, which weighed approximately
250-300 pounds, was located by the extensive tracking of five
houndsmen, and 26 dogs.13 The black bear was captured, killed, and
was confirmed by DNA testing to be the same bear that killed
Ives.14
9

Sara Israelsen, Boy killed by bear—The 11-year-old was pulled from his tent,
DESERET NEWS (June 19, 2007, 12:35 AM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
665194896/Boy-killed-by-bear.html?pg=all.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id.
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It was later revealed that the same black bear that killed Ives
had previously raided Timpooneke Campground, and had attacked
another camper.15 At the earlier incident, the camper, with the aide
of his friends, successfully chased off the black bear.16 The camper
notified Utah Highway Patrol, which then notified the Utah
Division of Wildlife Resources (DWR). DWR then went on a
search to track and destroy the bear - the DWR’s policy when
dealing with an aggressive ‘Level Three’ black bear.17 However,
the search proved fruitless, and DWS did not find or capture the
bear.18 The agents decided to return in the morning and clean the
campsite of food, or anything that might attract the bear back to the
site of the attack.19
The DWR agents left the site believing that no one would
use it, and even waved to the family of Samuel Ives (the Mulveys)
as they passed them going in the opposite direction on the road.20 In
fact, the DWR agents did nothing to warn anyone who might use at
the campground of the potential danger, nor did they warn any
potential camper of the earlier bear attack.21 Tragically, the
Mulveys did use the campground, and unfortunately, they failed to
properly pack away food items—including a can of soda and a
granola bar that young Ives brought into the tent for a later snack.22
Heartbreakingly, the same black bear that had earlier terrorized
15

Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 8 (noting that the bear attack on the other camper
occurred early in the morning of June 17, 2007, the same day that Samuel Ives
was killed).
16
Id.
17
Id. at ¶ 10. See also UTAH DIVISION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES, UTAH BLACK
BEAR MANAGEMENT PLAN PUBLICATION NO.00-23, (June 27, 2000) [hereinafter
BLACK BEAR MANAGEMENT PLAN] [p. 21] available at: http://wildlife.utah.gov/
bear/pdf/00bearplan.pdf (“Level Three bears are chronic or acute offenders that
have caused significant property damage or are a threat to human safety. The
prescribed solution is destruction of the bear, usually by Wildlife Services, with
which the DWR has a Memorandum of Understanding.”).
18
Id. at ¶ 11.
19
Id.
20
Id. at ¶ 13.
21
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 12.
22
Id. at ¶ 14.
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Timpooneke Campground returned in the night, stole Ives from the
family tent in his sleeping bag, and mauled him to death.23
III. CASE HISTORY AND RECENT RULING
Because of the travesty and the horrific death of their son,
the Mulveys initiated separate legal suits against the United States
government and the United States Forest Service, as well as the
State of Utah and the Utah Division of Wildlife Resources,
asserting “that state and federal officials knew about a bear
encounter with humans and searched for the bear but failed to close
the area until the animal could be found.”24
The Mulveys brought suit in United States District Court in
Francis v. United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act
(“FTCA”).25 More specifically, under the FTCA Ives’s asserted that
the United States Forest Service was negligent for its failure to
warn campers of the black bear, or to close the campground after it
knew of the bear’s presence in the area.26 In May 2011, the court
granted judgment in favor of the Mulveys, awarding them over $1.9
million dollars for the United States’ negligence in protecting
Samuel Ives.27

23

Id. at ¶ 14.
Sara Israelsen-Hartley, Family sues in '07 bear incident, DESERET NEWS (Mar.
29, 2009), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/695265672/Family-sues-in-07bear-incident.html?pg=all.
25
See Francis v. U.S., No. 2:08CV244 DAK, 2011 WL 1667915, at *1 (D. Utah
May 3, 2011).
26
Id.
27
Id. at 7-8, (Interestingly, in the opinion, the court found that the United States
was 65% fault for Samuel Ives’s death, that the State of Utah (through the
Department of Wildlife Resources) was 25% at fault for failing to contact the
Forest Service, and that the Mulveys were 10% at fault for attracting the bear
back to the site by leaving food out in the open. The court opined that although
no price could replace the life of young Samuel Ives that the amount of $3
million was an appropriate award based on other awards from previous childrelated wrongful death suits. However, the Mulveys were limited to collecting $2
million for the cap of liability from the United States government due to their
administrative claim under 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b). Therefore because the United
24

162

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 35:1

In the second, and more monumental action, the Mulveys
initiated suit in district court against the State of Utah and the
Department of Wildlife Services, in Francis v. State (Francis), in
March of 2008.28 Through the many appeals process, the
commencement of this action would prove paramount for the
purposes of this article, and in July 2013, would eventually lead to
the monumental determination of whether a black bear is a “natural
condition” on public or controlled lands.29 Similar to their
negligence claims against the United States government in Francis
v. UnitedStates, in Francis v. State, the Mulveys alleged negligence
on part of the State of Utah and the Department of Wildlife Services
(DWR) for failure to warn them about the dangerous bear in the
area.30
Initially, the district court dismissed the Mulveys’s claims
under the “permit exception” of the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act.31 The Mulveys appealed the decision, and the Supreme Court
reversed and held that the permit exception did not apply to the
particular facts of the case.32 The State of Utah, on remand, asserted
two alternative arguments: that it owed no duty to the Mulveys, and
even if it did, any liability was precluded under the “natural
condition” exception to the Utah Governmental Immunity Act—to
which the district court dismissed the case for a second time.33
States was 65% at fault, the Mulveys were awarded 65% of the $3 million
damages calculation, which equaled $1,950,000).
28
See generally Francis v. State, Utah Div. of Wildlife Res., 2010 UT 62, 248
P.3d 44.
29
Id.
30
Francis v. State, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 1; see also Francis v. U.S., No. 2:08CV244
DAK, 2011 WL 1667915, at *1 (D. Utah May 3, 2011) (where the Mulveys
asserted claims of negligence against the United States Forest Service under the
Federal Torts Claims Act).
31
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 1; see Utah Code Ann. § 63G-7-301 (5)(k) (West)
(where the “permit exception” provides that the immunity for a governmental
entity is not waived if the injury arises from “the issuance, denial, suspension, or
revocation of, or by the failure or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke, any
permit, license, certificate, approval, order, or similar authorization.”).
32
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 1.
33
Id. at ¶ 2; see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301 (5)(k) (West 2013).
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After the second dismissal, the Mulveys appealed and raised
three arguments: that under case law doctrine the State of Utah was
disallowed from presenting its alternative arguments on remand
because the alternative arguments had not originally been raised on
the record; that the State owed the Mulveys a duty of care; and
lastly that the “natural condition” exception of the Utah
Governmental Immunity Act was inapplicable to the State’s
defense.34 The State responded that it was not disallowed from
presenting the alternative arguments on remand; that it owed no
duty to the Mulveys because no “special relationship” had been
created; and that it was precluded from liability because the black
bear that attacked Samuel Ives was “natural condition” on the land
under the Immunity Act’s exception.35
Based on these arguments, in July 2013, the Supreme Court
of Utah reversed the district court’s previous grant of summary
judgment for the State.36 The court held that the State was not
barred in presenting its alternative arguments on remand; that the
State created a “special relationship” with the Mulveys37; and that a
bear was not considered a “natural condition” under the Immunity
Act, and therefore the State of Utah was not immune from
liability.38 Based on these holdings, the Utah Supreme Court
reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings that are to
be construed consistent with this most recent opinion.39
34

Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 2.
Id. at ¶ 3.
36
Id. at ¶ 4.
37
Id. at ¶ 34 (where the Supreme Court held that the State had created a “special
relationship” with the Mulveys because it took specific action to protect them as
the next group to use the campsite. After the initial attack on Mr. Francom [the
man who was attacked earlier the day of Ives’s death at the same campground]
DWR agents swept the campsite to make sure no one was there and that there
was nothing that would attract the bear back to the location. Because of this, the
court stated that the State knew of “a specific threat to a distinct group and took
specific action to protect that group”, and thereby created a “special relationship”
with anyone that would occupy the campsite, including the Mulveys).
38
Id. at ¶ 4.
39
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 49 (it should be noted that as this article went to print,
the case had been recently remanded, therefore there was no information
35
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IV. UTAH’S STATE IMMUNITY ACT AND THE
“NATURAL CONDITION” EXCEPTION
In Francis v. State (Francis), the crux of the State of Utah’s
liability hung on the issue of whether the black bear that killed Ives
was considered a “natural condition” on the land under Utah’s
Immunity Act, specifically section § 63G-7-301 (5)(k).40 The
interpretation and classification of the bear was crucial because if it
was considered a “natural condition” on the land, under the
operation of the Immunity Act, the State would have been
precluded from liability in Francis.41
Specifically, the Immunity Act states that Utah as a
governmental entity, does not waive immunity from suit if specific
injury arises, results, or is in connection with “any natural condition
on publicly owned or controlled lands.”42 However, the text of the
Immunity Act itself lacks clarification or direction as to what
constitutes or defines a “natural condition” on publicly owned or
controlled lands.43 The purpose of the “natural condition” exception
in Utah is to necessarily protect the State from liability arising on
Utah’s vast wild landscapes; it is unreasonable to expect the
government to protect every member of the public from every
potentially hazardous encounter on such terrain.44
In Francis, the State claimed that section 301(5)(k) of the
Immunity Act precluded any liability against the State, because
under interpretation of the statute, the black bear that killed Ives
was circumscribed as a “natural condition”.45 The court applied a
three-part-test, in order to determine whether the State of Utah had
immunity under Utah’s Immunity Act: (1) whether activity was
undertaken, which activity sanctioned as a governmental function;
available at the time of publication as to the final disposition of the case—
including any award of damages).
40
Id. at ¶ 39; see generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301 (5)(k) (West 2013).
41
Id. at ¶ 40; see generally UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301 (West 2013).
42
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301(5)(k) (West 2013) (emphasis added).
43
Id.
44
See Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 8.
45
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 16-17.

When Ferae Naturae Attack

165

(2) whether the government waived immunity for the particular
sanctioned governmental activity; and (3) whether there was an
exception to the waiver of immunity for the activity sanctioned as a
government function.46
In Francis, the only disputed part of the test was whether the
“natural condition” exception was applicable as an exception to the
State of Utah’s waiver of immunity.47 The court determined that the
“natural condition” exception was not applicable in the State’s case
as an exception to waiver of immunity, because the black bear that
killed Ives was not a “natural condition” on publicly owned or
controlled lands under section 301(5)(k) of the Immunity Act.48
The Utah Supreme Court’s puzzling interpretation that the
black bear that killed Ives was not a “natural condition” on the land
ultimately lost the State its case, and precluded the State from
asserting governmental immunity under Utah’s Immunity Act.49
Further, the interpretation of the Immunity Act under Francis,
raises serious public policy stretching over public, municipal,
safety, environmental, and economic concerns.50
V.THE MAJORITY’S “NATURAL CONDITION”
To fully understand the importance of the determination that
the black bear that killed Ives did not fall under the “natural
condition” exception in Francis, it is imperative to look first at how
the court came to its conclusion, which ultimately opened the State
to liability. This began with the court’s construction of statutory
interpretation generally, and then specifically of the narrow
interpretation of the Immunity Act’s “natural condition” exception.
The court in Francis stated that the determination of
whether any condition on the land is a “natural condition” is a
matter of statutory interpretation, and that the objective is to first
46

Id. at ¶ 39 (citing Blackner v. State, Dept. of Transp., 2002 UT 44, ¶ 10, 48
P.3d 949 (Utah 2002)).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
See generally Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 49.
50
See generally infra Section IX.
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look to the evidentiary intent and purpose of the legislature—
illustrated by the “plain meaning” of the text.51 Next, the court
stated that to define the “plain meaning” of the text, the court
should look to the “lay meaning” or usual (daily) meaning of the
text.52 To state otherwise, to comprehend legislative intent behind
the text of the statute, the court should look to the plain meaning. In
order to find the plain meaning of the text, the court should look to
an everyday or “ordinary” understanding of the text.
Specifically the court in Francis, construed the ordinary
meaning of the terminology “natural condition on the land”, citing
its own view as support for the definition of the term’s ‘ordinary
meaning’.53 The court used this interpretation scheme to determine
that, in its view, “condition on the land” meant features tied into the
land solely, such as rivers, trees, and lakes, and that because bears
are naturally transitory they don’t fit this ‘ordinary meaning’.54 The
court further determined that, in its view, “one would not ordinarily
refer to a bear, or wildlife generally, as a ‘condition on the land’”.55
The court thus limited the “natural condition” exception to solely
topographical features or conditions.56 The majority did so based on
its own opinion on the ordinary meaning, with no reference to any
other outside resources, other than its own past opinions where only
topographical structures were considered “natural conditions”.57
Aside from its own opinion that a bear was not considered a
“natural condition” under an ordinary meaning, the court further
relied on another Utah Supreme Court case, Grappendorf v.
Pleasant Grove City, with a similar holding.58 Grappendorf
involved the parents of a young, deceased boy, suing the city in a
wrongful death action after a major gust of wind picked up and
51

Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 41 (citing Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 9).
Id. (citing O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46, ¶ 32, 217 P.3d 704).
53
Id. at ¶¶ 41-42 (emphasis added).
54
Id. (emphasis added).
55
Id. (emphasis added) (the court extends the black bear to other forms of
“indigenous wildlife” in Utah for purposes of statutory interpretation).
56
Id. at ¶ 42-46.
57
See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 42-48.
58
Id. at ¶ 43-46.
52
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threw a moveable pitching mound at the boy and killed him.59 The
city asserted the “natural condition” exception to waiver of
immunity under the Immunity Act, stating that a gust of wind that
picked up the pitching mound was a “natural condition”.60
However, the city was unsuccessful in their claim of immunity
under the Immunity Act’s “natural condition” exception, as the gust
of wind was not considered a “natural condition” on the land.61
Similar to Francis, the court in Grappendorf encountered
the task of deciphering the meaning of a “natural condition” under
Utah’s Immunity Act.62 The majority considered the plain language
of the statute when determining applicability of the “natural
condition” exception.63 The court used the Webster’s Dictionary
and determined that the word “natural” was limited to something
produced or present in nature, and was then modified by the word
“condition”, which meant, a state of being or mode.64 It then stated
that the language “on publicly owned or controlled lands” limited
the terminology of “natural condition”, indicated a position on the
land “topographical in nature, not merely atmospheric”.65 The court
determined that the language of the statute required some physical
contact, supported by the surface, or a part of the land in order to be
a “natural condition” and that a gust of wind did not fall under the
exception of the Immunity Act.66
In Francis, the court gleaned seemingly additional support
that a “natural condition” is exclusively topographical in two other
Utah Supreme Court decisions, Stuckman ex rel. Nelson v. Salt
Lake City and Blackner v. Department of Transportation.67 The
59

Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 2.
Id. at ¶ 3.
61
Id. at ¶ 15
62
Id. at ¶ 10.
63
Id.
64
Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84 (citing WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY,
729 (1995)).
65
Id. at ¶ 10.
66
Id. at ¶¶ 10-15; (specifically the court stated, “[a]tmospheric conditions, like
the gust of wind that allegedly led to [the boy’s] fatal injuries, do not constitute
natural conditions on the land”).
67
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 44.
60
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court in Stuckman determined that a river was a “natural condition”
on the land.68 And avalanches (and the originating snow-packs)
were determined to be conditions on the land, in Blackner.69
Lastly, in Francis, the court naively reasoned that if the
legislature intended to include indigenous wildlife as part of the
Immunity Act’s “natural condition” exception, then it would have
specifically stated so.70 The court stated that when a statute leaves
the possibility for narrow exceptions open for interpretation, any
uncertainties should be resolved in way of the general provision
instead of the exceptions to the provision.71

VI. THE DISSENT’S “NATURAL CONDITION”–THE
APPROPRIATE INTERPRETATION UNDER PROPER
UTAH IMMUNITY ACT AND UTAH CASE LAW
ANALYSIS
The Utah Supreme Court’s reasoning behind the
interpretation that indigenous wildlife (specifically the black bear)
was not a “natural condition” is nothing but befuddling, and lacks
evidentiary support under proper interpretation of case law under
application of the Immunity Act. Because of this, Francis was not
a unanimous decision—as two justices appropriately wrote a
dissenting opinion.72 In the dissent’s opinion, the State was immune
68

Id. (citing Nelson By and Through Stuckman v. Salt Lake City, 919 P.2d 568,
574-75 (Utah 1996)).
69
Id. (citing Blackner, 2002 UT 44, ¶ 16).
70
Id. at ¶¶ 45-46.
71
Id. at ¶ 47 (citing Nini v. Mercer Cnty. Cmty. Coll., 995 A.2d 1094, 1100
(N.J. 2010)).
72
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 50 (Parrish, J., dissenting) (dissenting opinion was
filed by Justice Parrish, in which Justice Lee joined).
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because the presence of the black bear as indigenous wildlife
constituted a “natural condition on publicly owned or controlled
lands”.73 The dissent appropriately scrutinizes the majority’s
opinion, and illustrates that the holding should have affirmed that
indigenous wildlife constitutes a “natural condition” under a more
broad interpretation of the Immunity Act and prior case law.74
Because of these distinctions, the State should have been immune
from liability.75
A. Indigenous wildlife as a “natural condition” under
proper analysis of the ‘ordinary meaning’ under Utah’s
Immunity Act
The dissent stated that, although the majority used a proper
statutory analysis scheme to interpret the Immunity Act, it did not
come to the proper outcome in determining that indigenous wildlife
was not a “natural condition” on the land, as the “textual analysis
suggest[ed] the contrary conclusion”.76 The dissent criticized the
majority for “lack[ing] both explanation and textual analysis” for its
why, under the ordinary meaning, wildlife would not constitute a
“natural condition.”77
Contrary to the majority’s unfounded opinion, under the
plain language of the statute, the ordinary opinion of the “natural
condition” of Utah’s vast landscapes would undoubtedly include
wildlife as an essential component of the natural topography.78
Utah’s lands and wildlife, under the plain meaning and ordinary
opinion, are, and always have been intricately intertwined—fused
by nature.79 As the dissent eloquently states:
[l]ong before the borders of Utah were drawn, the
land, in its natural condition, contained large and
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

Id. at ¶¶ 50-62.
Id.
Id.
Id. at ¶ 51 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at ¶¶53-54.
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 54 (Parrish, J., dissenting).
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small indigenous wildlife in addition to its
topographical features. And today, conservation
efforts aimed at preserving the natural condition of
Utah’s public lands include support for and
rehabilitation of native species. To read “natural
condition” in the limited context of topographical
features ignores an entire segment of the unique
natural condition of Utah’s public lands.80
Further providing evidence of the lay opinion, the dissent
remarks that when drawing a comparison of the naturally existing
conditions between Utah and other states, one would irrefutably
describe the abundant and diverse wildlife that habituates Utah’s
lands.81 Additionally, this diverse wildlife is a component for
drawing in tourists, who visit particular areas of Utah’s landscapes
specifically to enjoy the diverse indigenous wildlife.82 This cogent
reasoning demonstrates that the majority was mistaken in its
analysis, and that under the ordinary ‘lay’ meaning, the meaning of
“natural condition” encompasses indigenous wildlife.
The majority’s narrow interpretation of the Immunity Act
goes against the very purpose of the Act, which was passed to
protect the State from particular liabilities, as it cannot be
reasonably expected to protect the public from every condition on
government owned natural lands.83 The dissent displays the
majority’s bewildering reasoning that if the legislature meant to
include wildlife within the statute it would have, as the court had
previously taken no issue with broadly construing the exception to
include to rivers, avalanches, and cliffs, even when the Act itself

80

Id.
Id. at ¶ 55 (specifically the dissent states that, “[a] component of the natural
condition of the land in Utah is the presence of deer, elk, moose, and black
bears”).
82
Id. (the dissent further draws a comparison between Utah and Yellowstone
National Park, as tourists are drawn to both Yellowstone and Utah for both the
topography as well as the wildlife).
83
See Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 8.
81

When Ferae Naturae Attack

171

does not expressly define such applicability.84 Therefore, the very
purpose of the Immunity Act has been and can be reasonably be
inferred to intend for a broad interpretation, in order for municipal
liability protection, and the majority should have construed the
Immunity Act broadly to effectuate this intent.
Lastly, and most interestingly, the majority perplexingly
admitted that wildlife could fall under this exception, stating, “we
readily acknowledge that wildlife could plausibly fall within the
scope of the natural condition exception”.85 With this admission the
majority displays that it is conceivable that the lay opinion could
reasonably include wildlife within the “natural condition”
exception.86 Therefore, its determination that the black bear did not
fall under the “natural condition” exception is capricious and
unfounded.
B. Indigenous wildlife as a “natural condition” under
proper analysis of Utah case law
The dissent further indicates that the majority improperly
interpreted and placed undue reliance on the foundation of the
Grappendorf case.87 A closer look at the actual reading of the
Grappendorf case reveals a much different result than the
majority’s conclusion.88 The Grappendorf case stated that “natural”
means to be “[p]resent in or produced by nature”, and is a modifier
to the word “condition” which means “[a][m]ode or state of

84

See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 60 (Parrish, J., dissenting); see also UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63G-7-301 (5)(k) (West).
85
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 45 (emphasis added).
86
See 2013 UT 65 at ¶ 60 (Parrish, J., dissenting).
87
Id. at ¶¶ 56-57.
88
Id., see Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, at ¶ 15. Interestingly, it should be noted
that Justice Parrish wrote the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in Grappendorf,
which held that an atmospheric condition on the land was not a “natural
condition” on the land, and also wrote the dissenting opinion in Francis, where
he disagrees that only topographical features constitute a “natural condition” on
the land.
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being.”89 The prepositional phrase “on publicly owned or controlled
lands” limits the terminology of “natural condition”.90 Then in
looking to the contextual usage of “on” would be “[u]sed to indicate
. . . [a] [p]osition above and in contact with” or “[c]ontact with a
surface, regardless of position.”91
Subsequently, under a more careful reading of Grappendorf,
a “natural condition” requires contact with the land, as it refers to a
state of being or a mode present or produced by nature, which, as
the dissent remarked, would include the black bear that attacked
Ives as indigenous wildlife.92 As the dissent stated:
[w]hile I would agree that one does not normally
refer to a particular animal as a ‘natural condition on
the land,’ the presence of indigenous wildlife
generally is as much a part of the natural condition
of land as are the rivers, lakes, or trees cited by the
majority.93
Further of issue is the majority’s interpretation that, under
Grappendorf, natural conditions must be only topographical.94 A
careful reading illustrates that the case did not exclusively limit
topographical conditions as “natural conditions” but rather held that
such features “can” constitute “natural conditions” as they are on
the land.95 The requirement merely states that a “natural condition”
needs to have its existence or physical contact on or with the land,
or be a part of the land.96 The purpose of the Grappendorf decision
was to exclude atmospheric conditions, like wind, from being
considered “natural conditions”, not to hold that topographical
conditions exclusively constitute such.97
89

Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 52 (citing Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 10 (citing
WEBSTER'S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 729 (1995))).
90
Id.
91
Id.
92
Id. at ¶ 53.
93
Id.
94
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 56 (Parrish, J., dissenting).
95
Id. at ¶¶ 56-57 (citing Grappendorf, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 10) (emphasis added).
96
Id.
97
Id.
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While the majority is correct that wildlife is not
topographical, it completely fails to recognize that wildlife is a part
of the land. It is erroneous to say that wildlife is not tangibly and
organically connected to the land, simply because it is transitory.98
There is a deep-rooted connection between wildlife and the land,
which forms a complete ecological cycle of nature. Wildlife is
created and is born on the land, it dies on the land, and its remains
become a part of the land. Contrary to the majority’s opinion,
wildlife is a part of the land, it is supported by the land’s surface,
and it is completely reliant ecologically for sustainment and its
natural habitat on the land.99 Because of this indissoluble
connection between wildlife and the land, the contextual analysis
requirements in Grappendorf; under the application of the
Immunity Act’s “natural condition” exception, was satisfied in
Francis.100
Another point of contention is the second case that the
majority cited as support, Blackner v. Department of
Transportation, where avalanches were considered a “natural
condition” under the Immunity Act exception.101 The Francis
dissent correctly pointed out that the majority’s holding in Francis
is directly and paradoxically in contrast with its previous holding in
Blackner, because an avalanche is not topographical itself, but only
originates and travels down or on top of features that are
topographical.102 The dissent in Francis stated:
[w]hile the path of an avalanche may be traced on a
map, its limited existence means that such efforts
will not endure when the weather or the season
changes. In this way, an avalanche shares little with
98

See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 42 (where majority states that in its opinion the
“ordinary meaning” of a “condition on the land” is tied with features that have a
much closer tie to the land, like lakes, rivers, trees, and topographical structures.
The majority states that because a bear is “transitory in nature” it is not directly a
part of the land).
99
Id. at ¶ 57 (Parrish, J., dissenting).
100
Id.
101
Id. at ¶ 58.
102
Id.
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enduring topographical features such as rivers or
cliffs, but is more akin to indigenous wildlife.103
The above distinction evidences that even a temporary,
seasonal, and arguably transitory product of weather, has been
considered a “condition on the land” for the purpose of the natural
condition” exception.104 Consequently, under the court’s very own
previous reasoning and holding, a “natural condition” on the land
need not be solely topographical, and can possess some cog of
natural transition to fit under the distinction.105 Where the court had
previously held that such a temporary and transitory condition on
the land, such as an avalanche, is a “natural condition” then, “native
species that have been supported for hundreds, if not thousands, of
years ‘on’ the land must also fall within the ambit of the natural
condition exception”.106 The majority’s own reasoning suggests that
indigenous wildlife should qualify under the description of a
“natural condition” on the land. To hold otherwise is paradoxical,
and goes against the court’s very own previous holdings.107
Therefore, under both the proper broad interpretation of the
Act’s ordinary meaning, and Utah case law, indigenous wildlife is a
“natural condition” on the land, and should have been so considered
as such by the majority. As the dissent rightfully argues, “the
presence of indigenous wildlife generally is as much a part of the
natural condition of land as are the rivers, lakes, or trees cited by
the majority”.108

103
104
105
106
107
108

Id.
See Blackner, 2002 UT 44, ¶¶ 15-16.
See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 58 (Parrish, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
Id.
See generally Blackner, 2002 UT 44, ¶¶ 15-16.
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 53 (Parrish, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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VII. WILDLIFE AS A “NATURAL CONDITION”—
SUPPORT FROM OTHER JURISDICTIONS WHERE
WILDLIFE HAS BEEN APPROPRIATELY INTERPRETED
AS A CONDITION ON THE LAND
Aside from the baffling holding of the majority in basing its
reasoning on paradoxical interpretation of both the Immunity Act
and Utah case law, had the majority comprehensively looked to
other states for elucidation on whether wildlife should be
considered a “natural condition”, it would have found that there is
support for the interpretation of wildlife as a condition on the
land.109 In fact, in many jurisdictions throughout the United States,
indigenous wildlife has been considered a naturally occurring
condition on the land, as construed broadly under particular
immunity or recreational statutes, and that the distinction is not
solely placed upon topographical structures in nature.110
Because the support from other jurisdictions involve injuries
caused by wildlife, it is first important to recognize how wildlife is
treated under tort law and the American legal system, in order to
better understand the reasoning behind other jurisdictional
decisions. In the American legal system, wild animals are often
called ferae naturae. Wild animals are defined as animals that are
not considered statutorily domesticated or controlled but rather are
“naturally untamable, unpredictable, dangerous, or mischievous.”111
“Wild creatures, such as game, are part of the land and pass with it,
though it cannot be said that they are within the ownership of any
particular person.”112 Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a
wild animal is one that “is not by custom devoted to the service of
mankind at the time and in the place in which it is kept.”113
109

See generally Arroyo v. State of California, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1995); Estate of Hilston ex rel. Hilston v. State, 160 P.3d 507 (Mont. 2007);
and Belhumeur v. Zilm, 949 A.2d 162 (N.H. 2008).
110
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 59 (Parrish, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
111
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (West).
112
Id. citing G.C. Cheshire, Modern Law of Real Property 118 (3d ed. 1933).
113
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 506 (1977).
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The Restatement of Torts advises that a landowner is not
generally liable for harm caused by wildlife on his or her property
unless the landowner exerts some containment or control of the
wild animal, or the animal was introduced to the area by the
landowner as a non-indigenous species.114 Generally, wild animals
are considered a “condition on the land” or a “natural condition”
under recreational use statutes (similar to immunity statutes—which
preclude liability).115
In stating the above, the following cases from neighboring
jurisdictions, should be considered in stark contrast to the Utah
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of the Utah Immunity Act,
and the holding that wildlife is not a “natural condition” in
Francis.116
A. Montana:
One of the closest cases on point to Francis is a Montana
Supreme Court case, Estate of Hilston ex rel. Hilston v. State,
where a hunter was the victim of a fatal grizzly bear attack.117 The
representative of the hunter’s estate sued the state for negligence
and sought damages for the attack that happened on state owned
land while the hunter was hunting elk.118
Unlike the Utah Supreme Court, the Montana Supreme
Court held that grizzly bears were “conditions of the property”
under Montana’s State Recreational Use Immunity Act, barring
Hilston’s representatives from recovering of damages against the
State.119
The Montana Supreme Court went through an analysis of
the important distinction of how the law has treated the
114

4 MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND LITIGATION § 37:2 (2d ed.).
Id. at § 39:36.
116
See generally Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 59 (Parrish, J., dissenting) (where the
dissent readily points to much of the following case law support to contrast the
majority’s decision with other jurisdictions).
117
See Hilston, 160 P.3d 507.
118
Id.
119
Id. at ¶ 17.
115
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classification and legal applications when dealing with wild
indigenous animals.120 The typical rule cited by the court was that
the owner of land is not liable for wild animals that are indigenous
to the land, unless the owner of the land has controlled possession
or the animal, or the animal is a non-native, that the owner
introduced to the area.121
The Montana Supreme Court determined that, because
grizzly bears are indigenous wild animals that exist upon the
property in the area of the attack, the bear fit under the “condition
of the property” for the Montana Recreational Use Immunity Act.122
B. California:
The opinion in Hilston cited a similar case, Arroyo v. State
of California, from the California Court of Appeals, which
supported the holding of wildlife being a condition of the land.123
Arroyo was a case about a young boy who was hiking a trail in a
state park with his family when he was mauled by a mountain
lion.124 The boy’s family sued the State for infliction of emotional
distress and negligence.125
Similar to the legal considerations in Francis and Hilston,
Arroyo dealt with the issue of state immunity under the California’s
immunity statute, called the California Tort Claims Act.126 The Act
“. . .provides an absolute immunity from liability for injuries

120

Id. at ¶¶15-17 (the court recognized the general legal distinction between
domitae naturae (domestic animals) and ferae naturae (wildlife) in terms of the
application of landowner duties and liabilities towards third parties under the law.
Generally under the law, a landowner assumes liability towards third parties
regarding injuries resulting from domestic animals. Contrastingly, generally
under the law, a landowner assumes no liability regarding injuries resulting from
wildlife).
121
Id. at ¶ 15, citing Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d 54, 60 (Tex. App. 1999).
122
Id. at ¶ 15.
123
Hilston, 160 P.3d 507 at ¶ 16, see Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627, 627.
124
Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 at 627.
125
Id.
126
Id.
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resulting from a natural condition of any unimproved public
property.”127
Also similar to the plaintiffs in Francis, the plaintiffs in
Arroyo asserted that a wild animal is not a “natural condition” of
the state park, and that only physical conditions to the land are
applicable under the statute.128 However, the court disagreed and
narrowly determined that within the statute (and interpreting the
intent of the legislature) wild animals are a natural condition of
unimproved public property, and fit within the meaning of the
statute because they are wild and the state did not have custody of
the animals.129
The court in Arroyo determined for policy reasons that the
State wanted to encourage the public use of hiking trails in public
regions, and that such immunity statutes help to relieve the State
from taking on the large burden of public safety, and of defending
against legal suits.130 The Court stated that the statute “. . .requires
the public to assume the risk of using hiking trails in state parks”.131
C. New Hampshire:
Even in cases with privately owned land, courts have readily
interpreted that wildlife is a “natural condition”. For example, the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire in Belhumeur v. Zilm, held that
wild bees, that attacked an individual, were a condition of purely
natural origin as condition on the land.132 Because of this, the court
determined under common law that the landowner, on whose land
the injury occurred, was immune from liability for injuries to
127

CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 831.2 (West).
Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 at 630-31.
129
Id., (the court cited the California Supreme Court’s reasoning in Ex parte
Maier, 37 P. 402, 404 (Cal. 1894), where it stated “[t]he wild game within a state
belongs to the people in their collective, sovereign capacity; it is not the subject
of private ownership, except in so far as the people may elect to make it so . . .
.”).
130
Id. at 631.
131
Id.
132
Belhumeur v. Zilm, 949 A.2d 162 (N.H. 2008).
128
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another resulting from the wild bees.133 The court reasoned that the
wild bees that attacked and injured an individual on the land were a
“condition of purely natural origin”. 134 Because the bees were wild
animals, indigenous to the property, and no evidence indicated that
the landowner contributed to the existence of the bees or nest, the
landowner was immune from liability under common law.135
The above cases illustrate that dangerous indigenous
wildlife have consistently been defined as a “natural condition” or
condition on the land, fitting neatly under immunity or recreational
act exceptions, as well as under common law. Aside from the above
cases, throughout numerous other jurisdictions in the United States,
migratory wildlife has been held to fit within the exceptions of
various immunity statutes.136
The Utah Supreme Court should have comprehensively
studied these examples, and gleaned that other jurisdictions support
the notion that indigenous wildlife is not solely confined to
topographical features, and therefore a black bear could, and should
have been considered a “natural condition” under the Immunity
Act.137 Like many of these other jurisdictions, the Utah Supreme
Court should have construed the “natural condition” exception more
broadly, as to include wildlife within the Immunity Act.

133

Id.
Id. at 163-64.
135
Id.
136
See generally Nicholson v. Smith, 986 S.W.2d 54, 60 (Tex. App. 1999)
(where the court held that a recreational vehicle park (RV park) was not liable for
injuries to camping guests caused by fire ants); and Palumbo v. State Game &
Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 487 So.2d 352, 353 (Fla. App. 1986) (where the court
held that a recreational park (RV park next to a state park) was not liable for
injuries to a swimmer resulting from an alligator attack. The court held that the
animal was in its natural habitat, natural in its own existence, and was indigenous
to the area—factors that barred liability on part of the State).
137
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 59 (Parrish, J., dissenting).
134
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VIII. WILDLIFE AS A “NATURAL CONDITION”—
LEGISLATIVE WORKS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR
LAWMAKERS
As the result in Francis dramatically displayed, regarding
municipal liability, lawmakers should decide whether wildlife
should be included within immunity and recreational use statutes.
Lawmakers facing the drafting and amending of immunity or
recreational acts, with an applicable “natural condition” (intended
to include indigenous wildlife), should look to other jurisdictions
where courts have construed such acts to include wildlife.
Lawmakers must further look to the specific language and
text of statutes that specifically state the inclusion of wildlife, to aid
as templates for drafting or amending the acts. This should be done
to give full effect of the statutes, by utilizing examples where courts
have found evidence of legislative intent in interpreting the laws
under the facts of particular cases, either under broad construction
or expressly. By using such examples in drafting or amending
immunity statutes, lawmakers can lay out a clear map to courts by
displaying clear intent to include indigenous wildlife under “natural
condition” exceptions—and hopefully protect the State from
outcomes like Francis.
Specifically, Utah lawmakers should redraft the current
Immunity Act—as to include indigenous wildlife within the
meaning of the “natural condition” exception; in order to preclude
particular municipal liability; and to avoid outcomes like Francis.
Listed below are several examples of immunity or recreation use
statutes, and court decisions regarding the interpretation of the acts.
These examples should benefit Utah (and like jurisdictions) as
suggestions in drafting or amending immunity statutes.
(1) Montana: The Montana Recreational Immunity Act
lacks specific legislative language that asserts explicitly that

When Ferae Naturae Attack

181

wildlife is considered a “condition of the property”.138 Instead, the
Montana Supreme Court has broadly construed the statute to
include wildlife as such a condition of the property.139 For instance,
in the Hilston case, the Supreme Court of Montana interpreted the
Recreational Immunity Act broadly to allow a grizzly bear to fit
under the exception of a “condition of the property”.140 The purpose
of the Recreational Immunity Act is to “grant a landowner relief
from liability to persons gratuitously entering land for recreation
purposes.”141 The Montana Recreational Immunity Act specifically
states:
A person who uses property, including property owned or
leased by a public entity, for recreational purposes, with or without
permission, does so without any assurance from the landowner that
the property is safe for any purpose if the person does not give a
valuable consideration to the landowner in exchange for the
recreational use of the property. The landowner owes the person no
duty of care with respect to the condition of the property, except
that the landowner is liable to the person for any injury to person or
property for an act or omission that constitutes willful or wanton
misconduct.142
(2) California: The purpose of the California Tort Claims
Act is to limit liability of particular public entities in order to ensure
that the public has access to certain recreational areas.143 The
limitation of liability is intended to result in cost savings to the
public, by eliminating the need for funds to cover ‘potential’
litigation defense costs that would occur otherwise, from injury
related suits on governmental lands.144 The Act specifically
138

MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-302 (West); cf. UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301
(5)(k) (West) (which also has a similar provision for “natural condition” but does
not define expressly what constitutes a “natural condition” on the land).
139
Hilston, 160 P.3d at ¶¶ 14-15.
140
Id.
141
Simchuk v. Angel Island Comty. Ass'n, 833 P.2d 158, 161 (Mont. 1992),
overruled by Saari v. Winter Sports, Inc., 64 P.3d 1038 (Mont. 2003).
142
MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-16-302(1) (West) (emphasis added).
143
Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 630.
144
Id.
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includes a non-exclusive list of topographical features, but does not
limit the list as inclusive of only topographical features as natural
conditions.145 The California Tort Claims Act provides:
Neither a public entity nor a public employee is
liable for an injury caused by a natural condition of
any unimproved public property, including but not
limited to any natural condition of any lake, stream,
bay, river or beach.146
Although wildlife is not specifically mentioned in the
statute, the court in Arroyo broadly interpreted the statute to include
a mountain lion as indigenous wildlife that would constitute a
“natural condition” under the immunity provision.147 In California,
courts have construed the “natural condition” exception to include:
a lake boating accident; an injury from a man-made sandbar on a
beach; the collapse of a cliff in an unimproved area of a state park;
death from falling rocks; and the death of an individual caused by
mauling by a mountain lion in a state park.148
(3) Texas: In Texas, although wild animals are not
explicitly mentioned by the Texas Tort Claims Act, the Editor’s
Notes section states that under the recreational use statute, “natural
conditions” include “. . .a sheer cliff, a rushing river, or even a
concealed rattlesnake”.149 This clearly suggests that in Texas the
statute does not exclusively include topographical structures, but
also includes wild animals as a “natural condition”.
(4) Wisconsin: Wisconsin’s Recreational Use Statute
explicitly states that wild animals fall within the liability exceptions
of the State (with limited exceptions). Stating that a landowner, or
governmental agent is not “. . .liable for the death of, any injury to,
or any death or injury caused by, a person engaging in a
recreational activity on the owner’s property or for any death or

145
146
147
148
149

CAL. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 831.2 (West) (2012).
Id. (emphasis added).
Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 630.
2 Cal. Affirmative Def. § 38:108 (2013 ed.).
TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002 (West) (emphasis added).
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injury resulting from an attack by a wild animal”.150 This language
makes it clear that wild animals are included within the liability
exception for the state, and is helpful for potential interpretation
issues, because of the transparency of including wild animals within
the statute.
Although the majority in Francis stated that if the
legislature intended wildlife to be considered within the Immunity
Act, it would have stated so in the Act, statutes and decisions from
other jurisdictions; as illustrated above, indicate otherwise.151 In
fact, it seems the opposite is true, that courts in these jurisdictions
interpret applicable Immunity Acts more broadly to encompass
wildlife as an applicable condition on the land, or a “natural
condition”. The Utah Supreme Court should have likewise
interpreted Utah’s Immunity Act broadly to allow for the black bear
to be considered as part of the “natural condition” exception, which
would have precluded liability for the State.
Because Francis displayed that the Utah Supreme Court
requires more definite language to consider wildlife a “natural
condition”,152 lawmakers should change the Immunity Act to
expressly include indigenous wildlife. Currently, the Utah
Immunity Act and natural condition exception reads:
Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is
not waived [. . .] if the injury arises out of, in
connection with, or results from [. . .] (k) any natural
condition on publicly owned or controlled lands.153
It is proposed that Utah lawmakers make the following
necessary changes to the current Immunity Act, as to explicitly
include indigenous wildlife within the definition of the natural
condition exception:
Immunity from suit of each governmental entity is
not waived [. . .] if the injury arises out of, in
150

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.52(2)(b) (West), (emphasis added).
See Hilston, 160 P.3d at ¶¶ 14-15; Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 630; Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 75.002 (West).
152
Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 45-47.
153
UTAH CODE ANN. § 63G-7-301(5)(k) (West).
151
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connection with, or results from [. . .] (k) any natural
condition on publicly owned or controlled lands—
[where natural condition refers to both naturally
occurring topographical structures on the land (such
as rivers, lakes, and mountains), as well as
indigenous wildlife on the land].
This simple change to the text of the statute would satisfy
the ‘want’ of the majority in Francis for the legislature to expressly
include the intended language on wildlife in the statute.154 Utah and
similar jurisdictions should take note from the express legislative
language used in jurisdictions Texas and Wisconsin, where
immunity statutes expressly state that wild animals fall within the
“natural condition” exception, or fall under the immunity exception
in general.155
IX. WILDLIFE EXCLUDED AS A “NATURAL
CONDITION”—PUBLIC POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
UNDER FRANCIS
It could be argued that, as a matter of public policy, the Utah
Supreme Court came to the correct decision in Francis. One such
concern is that the court is not extending the “natural condition”
exception past what the legislature had stated within the statute.156
Interpretation of the statute under a conservative or traditional
‘textualist’ reading might agree that the Utah Supreme Court
interpreted the statute correctly by following the letter of the law
within the bounds of the text of the statute.157 Textualists would
154

Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 45-47.
See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 75.002 (West 2007); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 895.52(2)(b) (West 2013).
156
See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 45-47.
157
‘Textualist’, derived from ‘textualism’ is a traditionally based theory of
statutory interpretation, where the text within the statute is solely the evidentiary
basis of the statue's original meaning, and governs how the statute should be
interpreted. This is contrasted with other methods of statutory interpretation
schemes, such as looking into the intent of the legislature, and a historical
meaning behind the passing of the statute, as aid in interpretation of the meaning
155
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argue in line with the majority in Francis, that if the legislature
intended wildlife to be considered a “natural condition” on the land,
then they would have put the language in the statute.158
Certainly, public policy may dictate that a narrow
construction of the statute is required. However, as other
jurisdictions with similar statutes have proven, immunity acts have
been construed broadly, despite the lack of specific inclusion of
wildlife within the text of the acts.159 Unlike the majority’s
reasoning, it is inconceivable and irrational for the legislature to
expressly list every single mechanism that constitutes a “natural
condition” within the exception of the statute in order for the court
to construe the statute appropriately.160 Reasonably, the very intent
of the Immunity Act calls for broad application, to protect the State
from liabilities arising from hazards on unimproved government
property.161 The court itself had previously broadly construed the
Act under prior case law to include topographical features, when
the Act does not expressly provide for such application.162
Therefore, the majority’s narrow ‘textualist’ interpretation that the
black bear was not a “natural condition” under the Immunity Act’s
exceptions was unsubstantiated, and it should have held otherwise.
Further reflecting the majority’s opinion, is the idea of
public satisfaction in holding the State of Utah responsible for
heightened safety concerns in state parks and on state lands. Had
the court come to an opposite conclusion, the results could have
caused serious apprehensions about the idea of State immunity in
general. The public could have possibly taken issue with the State,

of the text; see generally Textualism, JUDGEPEDIA.ORG, http://judgepedia.org/
index.php/Textualism (last visited Nov 1, 2013).
158
See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 46, (where the majority states, “the legislature
could easily have stated expressly that the State retains immunity for injuries
arising from indigenous wildlife”).
159
See generally Arroyo, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 627 (Cal. App. 2d Dist.1995); Hilston,
160 P.3d 507 (Mont. 2007).
160
See generally Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 60.
161
See Grappendorf v. Pleasant Grove City, 2007 UT 84, ¶ 8 (Utah 2007).
162
See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶ 60. (Parrish, J., dissenting); see also UTAH CODE
ANN. § 63G-7-301 (5)(k) (West 2008).
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for having preclusion to liability in egregious situations on public
lands involving wildlife. This could potentially result in public
distrust in the legislature, as well as the current Immunity Act and
State system. However, even if such public dissatisfaction and
distrust were to result, then a public call to action for the legislature
to change the law could occur. It can be argued that it often takes
tragic or unfortunate occurrences to display areas of the law that
call for reformation or change; such change is a necessary
component in our political system and society as a democracy.
There could have been negative public backlash through
public condemnation, by not holding the state liable for the
incident—especially when state agents had knowledge of the bear’s
presence in the area.163 In the court of public opinion, the people
would likely empathize with the side of apparent ‘justice’ for an
innocent 11-year old, who met such tragic ends—even if such
‘justice’ comes at the cost of the inappropriate statute interpretation.
However, the public should be far more concerned if the judiciary
chooses its decisions based on public satisfaction over the proper
interpretation of the law. Such risky decision-making places the
entire concept of the law and justice in a box of invalidity and
arbitrariness. This result does not provide justice, and is certainly
not exemplar for a law abiding society.
Finally, those who side with the majority might also argue
that were the State not liable in Francis, then it would result in
decreased tourism because of public fear in visiting government run
parks. These results could ultimately have an adverse effect on the
economic system’s entire economy and of the State and Parks
Systems. However, there are heavier negative implications
regarding public policy and economic concerns under the decision
in Francis.164
As will be discussed, the Utah Supreme Court’s decision in
Francis, carries far more potentially damaging public policy
163

See Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 7-10 (where the court discusses that the DWR
had knowledge that an aggressive black bear had frequented the campground
earlier the day of Samuel Ives’s death).
164
See infra text and accompanying notes in Section 0.
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consequences for the public, than if it had held that wildlife is a
“natural condition” on the land.165 Primarily, governmental liability
costs taxpayers money in general, as funds are redistributed to
cover potential litigation costs and settlements.166 Because of
Francis, an entirely new classification of liability causing devices
has now been recognized—which is wildlife.167 By adding wildlife
as another group of devices that can create liability for the State, the
ramifications from this heightened liability will adversely cost the
taxpayers, local economies, the State Parks System, and will
ultimately cause an unreasonable burden to the State.168 As will be
discussed, the decision in Francis could detriment Utah’s
indigenous wildlife populations, and such faunae have previously
been and should continue to be protected and preserved.169
Generally governmental liability imposes significant
burdens and costs on taxpayers, and specifically burdens the portion
of the public needing governmental assistance—who are likely to
lose out on resources when fund allocation goes to paying litigation
costs and judgments.170 For instance, the allocation of resources in
regards to taxes and governmental funds are significantly reduced
because of governmental tort liability, regarding the “optimal ratio
of government benefit to taxes” by elected officials.171 When
judgments and litigation expenses are rendered against the State,
government officials are faced with the decision to reduce funds
available for future allocation, raise taxes, or to incur and divert the
debt to future budgets where it will be repaid at market-rate-interest
(jurisdiction permitting).172
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See generally Francis, 2013 UT 65, ¶¶ 48-49 (where the court holds that the
black bear is not a “natural condition” under the Immunity Act, therefore the
State could not raise this defense to preclude its liability).
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See infra text and accompanying notes 174-184.
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Currently, Francis is in remand, and because the State has
been precluded from asserting immunity for liability under the
Immunity Act, this could likely result in the State paying damages
to the Mulveys; the calculations of which could be potentially
significant. As was mentioned in the beginning of this article, the
Samuel Ives’s family (the Mulveys) was awarded over 1.9 million
dollars from the United States after winning its suit in federal
court.173 It can be inferred that if state and federal parks and entities
were held liable for every unfortunate act where indigenous wildlife
injured a human, then such large awards reasonably could preclude
public use and park economic viability.
In fact, the Utah Park System and some parks are already
facing financial difficulties and the possibilities of closure. Due to
existing budget concerns and deficiencies, a 2011 Utah State Park
Legislative Audit Report suggested that the State consider the
privatization, or pilot the privatization of several State parks.174 In
2011, only nine out of forty-three Utah parks made enough money
to not require State funding.175 Therefore, lawmakers ordered the
report to collaborate ideas on how to make Utah parks more
efficient.176 The Audit Report proposed that in order to cut costs,
certain parks should be completely closed, and that jobs and
employee positions should be completely eliminated for many of
the Utah parks.177
Further, the Utah State Park’s General Fund has been
significantly decreasing in recent years—from over $12-million
dollars in 2008, to only $6.8 million in 2012.178 This decrease has
173

See Francis v. U.S., No. 2:08CV244 DAK, 2011 WL 1667915, at *7-8 (D.
Utah May 3, 2011).
174
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resulted in the reduction of many of the parks’ dates of operation
and hours; fewer outreach programs; fewer law enforcement
officers in the parks; the deferment of many maintenance issues and
repairs; as well as the termination of twenty-two full-time
employees.179
Adding proverbial fuel to the already existing financial fire
for State parks and local economy was the recent partial
government shutdown in October 2013. Closure for the majority of
the parks lasted approximately ten days, before any State
intervention for any re-openings.180 Because of the partial
shutdown, it was estimated that Utah’s tourism took a significant
financial impact loss of 30 million dollars, with a majority of the hit
coming from the closure of national and state parks and related
businesses.181
It is therefore reasonable to deduce that the already existing
financial burdens will not improve with newly impending
heightened liability on the State; government funds could be
tightened generally, and specifically for the allocation of certain
programs. If heightened liability adds to the dissolution of State
Park funds, it is also reasonable to conclude that this will have a
rippling adverse impact on the public—as State Parks make up an
essential part of the Utah’s public economy and way of life.182
Utah’s Department of Natural Resources has stated, “[t]he Utah
state park system was created to provide recreation and educational
opportunities for citizens of Utah and to stimulate local
economies.”183 According to the Utah Department of Natural
Recourses (DNR), state parks provide “tremendous economic

files/ UtStPksBudgetPresentation2011-09.pdf (last visited Sept. 14, 2013).
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180
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benefits to [Utah’s] state and local communities through increased
revenue and tourism”.184
Additionally, it is completely irrational to place the burden
of protecting the public from indigenous wildlife on the State. The
dissent in Francis reasonably acknowledged the key importance of
the natural condition exception for State immunity, opining that
especially in naturally dense public lands, like Utah’s vast natural
landscape, the government cannot be expected to protect every
person against every condition that might be dangerous on public
lands.185 Placing this heavy burden of liability on the State would
result in serious restrictive measures and prohibitions on public use
of respective lands.186 As the dissent stated in its conclusion, “[t]he
natural condition exception thus requires that those who voluntarily
use unimproved public land assume some of the related risks as part
of the price paid for the benefits of its use.”187 Furthermore, wildlife
are potentially unpredictable and dangerous, and for these reasons
alone, it should be considered unreasonable for the public to expect
the State to protect it from every incident of contact with wildlife on
State lands.188 Injury is therefore a “foreseeable” risk that one takes,
when adventuring in the “unimproved wilderness”, and the State
should not be responsible for this risk.189
Lastly, there also must be some protection in place for
indigenous wildlife in their natural habitats, as Utah’s wildlife has
184
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significance to its natural ecology and people.190 The majority of
Utah’s vast, wild, landscape is made up of governmental public
lands; reasonably the natural habitat of many of Utah’s indigenous
wildlife species populations is located within these boundaries.191
This means that realistically, many times humans are stepping into
the natural habitat of wildlife, not vice versa. Further, unfortunately
natural-habitat-loss in Utah has already resulted in the reduction of
many native wildlife populations throughout the state, calling for a
comprehensive
wildlife
conservation
strategy.192
These
conservation strategies and relating funds were put in place under
strong policy concerns to “effectively restore and enhance wildlife
populations and their habitat[s], and prevent the need for additional
listings on the Endangered Species List”.193 Such conservation
efforts support the idea of the public concern for the “rehabilitation
190

Specifically Utah’s indigenous bear population carries significant past and
present ecological and cultural symbolic importance to Utah’s Ute Indian Native
American Tribes. Even annually, many tribes hold a ceremonial spring social
dance where they perform the Ute Bear Dance; which origins back to the
fifteenth century. See Lynda D. McNeil, Ute Indian Bear Dance: Related Myths
and Bear Glyphs spot.colorado.edu/~Imcneil/UteBearDance.pdf (last visited
Nov. 13 2013); The Southern Ute Indian Tribe, SOUTHERN UTE INDIAN TRIBE,
http://www.southernute-nsn.gov/culture/bear-dance/ (last visited Nov. 13 2013).
191
See generally GOVERNOR’S PUBLIC LANDS POLICY COORDINATION OFFICE,
http://governor.utah.gov/PublicLands/; and http://governor.utah.gov/
PublicLands/Images/Map_UtahFederalLand8x11.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2013)
(where according to the site and accompanying map, 64% of Utah lands are
managed by the Federal government, and 10% managed by the State); see also
BUREAU OF LAND MGMT, UTAH STATE OFFICE, http://www.blm.gov/ut/st/en.html
(last visited Nov. 14, 2013) (where the Utah BLM states that it manages
approximately 42 percent of the State of Utah, which encompasses approximately
22.9 million acres of public lands); see also generally UTAH DIV. OF WILDLIFE
RES. PUBL’N NO. 05-19: UTAH COMPREHENSIVE WILDLIFE CONSERVATION
STRATEGY (effective Oct. 1 2005-2015) [hereinafter CONSERVATION STRATEGY],
http://wildlife.utah.gov/cwcs/11-03-09_utah_cwcs_strategy.pdf (last visited Nov
1, 2013) (where the Conservation Strategy covers the conservation concerns and
efforts of many diverse specimens of Utah’s wildlife, many of which are located
on Utah’s public lands).
192
CONSERVATION STRATEGY, supra note 191, at 3-5.
193
Id.

192

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW & POLICY

Vol. 35:1

of native species” as part of the “natural condition” of Utah
lands.194 Utah has long-standing public policy concerns for
protecting even seemingly dangerous wildlife in the State of Utah;
the black bear and cougar populations have both been specifically
protected species since 1967.195
In certain instances, like in the Francis case, when such
unfortunate attacks occur, the animals are often hunted down and
terminated under State policy.196 Although there are reasonable
policy concerns for the termination of proven deadly or dangerous
animals for the protection of the public, there are policy concerns
for protecting and preserving these wild animals in their own
domain.197 Wildlife should remain protected, especially when in
certain circumstances humans are theoretically merely visitors in
the wild and wondrous natural world, and are reasonably on the
‘turf’ of indigenous wildlife.
X. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, The Utah Supreme Court in Francis, should
have held that the black bear that killed Samuel Ives, as indigenous
wildlife, constituted a “natural condition” under proper
interpretation of both Utah’s Immunity Act, as well as Utah case
law, and therefore liability against the State of Utah should have
been precluded in the case. A black bear is as much a part of the
land, as the land itself as a part of nature; the majority even admits
that it reasonably could be perceived as a “natural condition”.198
Further, Utah case law has not precluded the determination that
indigenous wildlife fall under the “natural condition” exception of
the Immunity Act.199
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Although there could have been potential concerns of public
distrust and negative backlash for not holding the State of Utah
liable under the Immunity Act in Francis, there are heavier negative
policy concerns in the current decision that spread over public,
municipal, safety, environmental, and economic concerns. As has
been discussed, State Parks are already grappling with serious
financial and budgetary issues, and adding liability suits against the
State will reasonably only add to these budgetary issues.200 Such
issues could reasonably be said to cause a chain reaction in the
reduction and even possible closure of State Parks; the public could
potentially lose access to beloved recreational activity, or such
places could become privatized with increased costs for public use.
The addition of heightened liability on the State, could reasonably
further inflame the already troublesome budgetary concerns facing
the Utah State Parks system.201 As a trickling-effect, this liability
could also potentially hurt the employment and overall economies
for the State of Utah, as well as the taxpayers.
Further, although injuries and deaths caused by indigenous
wildlife, on government owned land are tragic, existing Immunity
Acts and statutes should be interpreted broadly to allow for
indigenous wildlife to fall under the definition of a “natural
condition” or “condition” on the land. If the courts refuse to broadly
construe the “natural condition” exception, Utah, and similar
lawmakers, should amend Immunity Acts to reflect that a “natural
condition” to not only include topographical structures, but also
indigenous wildlife. At the very least, lawmakers should include
such information in the commentary to Immunity or Recreational
Acts. These simple changes could rectify interpretative issues, and
ensure that wildlife is expressly incorporated into intended
immunity exceptions. Such changes would further relieve some of
the major policy driven concerns that were previously discussed for
the State of Utah, and other states facing similar issues.
Lastly, there should be a balance struck between human
enjoyment of State parks, along with the preservation of indigenous
200
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wildlife and its natural habitats. And court interpretations like
Francis could have a negative impact on these efforts. Because
wildlife in Utah has been excluded as a “natural condition” on the
land, the State now faces potentially serious liability implications
concerning the protection of the public from indigenous wildlife on
government owned lands.202 The public should be able to use public
property in its “natural condition” for enjoyment and recreational
purposes, but the burden of litigation and safety costs could
detrimentally affect public use of such properties, and wildlife
populations.203
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